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Monday, December 11, 2006

Sago Report Postponed; (get my judgement today)

Though it has not been officially released, the state report on the Sago mine explosion, leaked to the AP, cites lightning as the primary cause of the blast, generating a force five times what seals were able to withstand.

Unfortunately, this may lead some to believe that this relieves the non-union company, International Coal Group (ICG), of responsibility. Not so. Disasters will happen, especially those that are of the natural variety and very likely will be beyond our control. However, the way in which we respond to an event, or better still prepare for its eventuality is well within our control.

So how did ICG prepare and respond?

“Ken Ward, Jr., in a January 3, 2006 story in the Charleston Gazette, "Sago mine has history of roof falls", wrote that the most recent MSHA inspections, from early October to late December, resulted in 46 citations and three orders, 18 of which were “serious and substantial.” (S&S) Violations include failure to follow the approved roof control and mine ventilation plans and problems concerning emergency escapeways and required pre-shift safety examinations. From early July to late September, MSHA found 70 violations, 42 of which were S&S. MSHA found 52 violations from April to June, of which 31were S&S.

Ward explains, "These “S&S” violations are those that MSHA believes are likely to cause an accident that would seriously injure a miner."

Davitt McAteer, MSHA chief during the Clinton administration told Ward, "The numbers don’t sound good....[they are] sufficiently high that it should tip off management that there is something amiss here. For a small operation, that is a significant number of violations.” McAteer said the roof fall frequency “suggests that the roof is bad and that the support system is not meeting the needs of the roof.” [link]

Ken Ward, Jr., wrote in a January 15, 2006 story entitled Chaos marred critical early hours after blast, that the company did not call a specialized mine rescue crew until 8:04 a.m. — more than 90 minutes after the blast. The company notified the federal Mine safety and Health Administration at 8:30 a.m. The company said it started its calls at 7:40. MSHA records two calls at 8:10 to personnel who were out of town due to the holiday. MSHA arrived on site at approximately 10:30 a.m. The first rescue crew arrived ten minutes later.” [link]

ICG was not prepared and responded in a criminally slow way, possibly robbing the miners of their only reasonable chance for rescue. Then again, if the federal government had real, aggressive people in charge of MSHA instead of industry insiders this might have been prevented.

I can’t wait for the civil trials to start so that we the people can give these creeps at least a small measure of what they deserve.

Full release of the report is being delayed due to a request by victims' families for more information.

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